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Antitrust Enforcement Encourages Health
Care Providers to Cooperate
Procompetitively
David Marx, Jr.*
Christopher M. Murphy**
In 1993, the federal and state antitrust enforcement agencies
openly and unabashedly encouraged the health care industry to
engage in cooperative efforts to reduce costs and provide serv-
ices more efficiently.' While encouraging the formation of joint
ventures among competitors, these same agencies also sent a
clear message that they would challenge those arrangements
that are formed for an anticompetitive purpose or operated in
an anticompetitive manner. Moreover, the significant judicial
decisions in 1993 in cases initiated by private plaintiffs were con-
sistent with the agencies' enforcement philosophy. Thus, in
1993:
e The Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commis-
sion jointly issued antitrust enforcement policy state-
ments for the health care field that set out specific
"antitrust safety zones" specifying when the federal agen-
cies will not challenge provider conduct, but that also
highlight the fact-intensive nature of antitrust analysis
* David Marx, Jr. is a partner in the litigation department of McDermott, Will &
Emery's Chicago office, where he specializes in antitrust law. Prior to joining McDer-
mott, Will & Emery, he was a senior trial attorney at the Antitrust Division of the
Department of Justice and at the Federal Trade Commission. He is a co-author of
ANTITRUST: CHALLENGE OF THE HEALTH CARE FIELD, published by the National
Health Lawyers Association in 1990.
** Christopher M. Murphy is an associate in the litigation department of McDer-
mott, Will & Emery's Chicago office. He received his Bachelor of Science from Ge-
orgetown University in 1987 and his Juris Doctor from the University of Chicago in
1990.
1. Several states enacted legislation intended to immunize certain health care col-
laborative activities from the antitrust laws. Because the validity of the scope of pro-
tection intended to be afforded by the statutes has not yet been tested, it is too soon
to tell whether these legislative efforts will achieve their purpose. For a more detailed
discussion of these local "hospital cooperation acts," see Sarah S. Vance, Immunity for
State-Sanctioned Provider Collaboration After Ticor, 62 ANTITRUST L.J. 409 (1994);
David Marx, Jr., State Hospital Cooperation Acts: Are They Sufficient Antitrust Shel-
ter for Hospital Collaborations? 10 HEALTHSPAN 3 (1993).
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and the need for individual examination of transactions
and conduct in specific markets;
" These enforcement agencies spoke greatly about hospital
merger enforcement but did little to stem the tide of con-
solidation among hospitals;
" Courts granted immunity to hospitals and their staffs in
staff privileges cases under the Health Care Quality Im-
provement Act, but construed the language of the Act
narrowly and required strict compliance with its notice
and hearing requirements; and
" The enforcement agencies encouraged the formation of
physician networks and managed care organizations, but
expressed their concern with exclusive arrangements and
abuse of market power.
A review of developments in 1993 demonstrates that the anti-
trust laws should not impede innovative, cost-cutting coopera-
tive arrangements among providers, as long as the
anticompetitive effects of the arrangements do not outweigh the
actual or potential procompetitive benefits.
I. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AND FEDERAL TRADE
COMMISSION ISSUE ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT
POLICY STATEMENTS IN THE HEALTH CARE
AREA
On September 15, 1993, the Justice Department and the Fed-
eral Trade Commission (FTC) jointly issued six Statements of
Antitrust Enforcement Policy in the Health Care Area, setting
forth certain "antitrust safety zones" that describe the circum-
stances under which the federal antitrust agencies will not chal-
lenge provider conduct, "absent extraordinary circumstances."
The policy statements address: 1) hospital mergers; 2 2) hospital
joint ventures with high technology or other expensive medical
equipment;3 3) information provided by physicians to purchas-
ers (for example, third-party payers or self-insured employers)
of health care services;4 4) hospital participation in exchanging
price and cost information;5 5) joint purchasing arrangements
among health care providers; 6 and 6) physician network joint
2. 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 13,150, at 20,757 (Sept. 15, 1993).
3. Id. at 20,758.
4. Id. at 20,761.
5. Id. at 20,762.
6. Id. at 20,763.
[Vol. 3
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ventures.7 The statements also explain the analysis these agen-
cies will use to determine antitrust liability and give examples of
situations in which the agencies would not challenge an arrange-
ment that would fall outside an antitrust safety zone. Finally,
the agencies commit themselves to responding expeditiously to
health care providers' requests for guidance.
A. The Substance of the Policy Statements
1. Hospital mergers
The antitrust safety zone set forth in the statement for hospi-
tal mergers applies to any merger between two general acute
care hospitals when one of the hospitals, over the three most
recent years, 1) has fewer than one hundred licensed beds, and
2) has an average daily inpatient census of fewer than forty pa-
tients. This safety zone does not apply if that hospital is less
than five years old.
Though they reaffirmed the applicability of the 1992 Horizon-
tal Merger Guidelines9 to hospital mergers, the agencies identi-
fied several situations in which a hospital merger would not be
challenged even though the market concentration might other-
wise raise an inference of anticompetitive effects. These include
mergers 1) after which the merged hospital would still face
strong competitors or between merging hospitals sufficiently dif-
ferentiated from each other (for example, offering more com-
plementary than competitive services); 2) that would allow the
hospitals to realize significant cost savings that could not other-
wise be achieved; or 3) that would eliminate a hospital that
likely would fail resulting in its assets exiting the market.
This safety zone departs significantly from traditional hospital
7. Id. at 20,764.
8. 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 13,150. In a dissenting statement against the issu-
ance of the policy statements, FTC Commissioner Deborah K. Owen criticized the
policy statements as a "special-interest antitrust exemption" that "raises the specter of
less energetic prosecution." The Commissioner emphasized that the exceptions to the
safety zones for "extraordinary circumstances" might undermine the aim of predict-
ability and that the risk of private treble damages litigation remains. 4 Trade Reg.
Rep. (CCH) 1 13,235 (Sept. 21, 1993) (dissenting Statement of Commissioner
Deborah K. Owen on DOJ/FTC Antitrust Enforcement Policy Statements in the
Health Care Area) [hereinafter Owen Statement].
9. 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 13,104 (May 5, 1992). The 1992 Horizontal Merger
Guidelines were designed to describe the analytic framework and specific standards
applied by the agencies in determining whether to challenge a horizontal merger. The
unifying theme of the Merger Guidelines is that mergers should not be permitted to
create or enhance market power or to facilitate its exercise.
19941
3
Marx and Murphy: Antitrust Enforcement Encourages Health Care Providers to Coopera
Published by LAW eCommons, 1994
Annals of Health Law
merger analysis in looking at only one of the merging hospi-
tals.10 Unlike the analysis under the Merger Guidelines, the
safety zone does not take into account the presence or absence
(and competitive strength or weakness) of other hospitals in the
market. Nevertheless, because the safety zone is limited to hos-
pitals with an average daily census of fewer than forty patients,
it is unlikely to apply in many transactions that otherwise would
have raised serious antitrust concerns.
2. Hospital medical equipment joint ventures
One policy statement sets forth an antitrust safety zone for
any joint venture among hospitals to purchase, operate, and
market the services of high technology or other expensive medi-
cal equipment if the joint venture includes only the number of
hospitals needed to support the equipment. Also, a joint ven-
ture that includes additional hospitals will not be challenged if
the additional hospitals could not support the equipment on
their own or through the formation of a competing joint ven-
ture. The joint venture participants will have the burden of jus-
tifying with objective evidence both the need for the venture
and the number of participants.
This statement provides that joint ventures outside the safety
zone will be scrutinized using the traditional four-step rule of
reason analysis, which consists of 1) defining the relevant mar-
ket in which the service produced through the joint venture
competes; 2) evaluating the venture's competitive effects; 3) as-
sessing the procompetitive efficiencies generated by the venture;
and 4) reviewing any agreements between the venture partners
that are ancillary to the joint venture. The purpose of this analy-
sis is to determine whether the joint venture may reduce compe-
tition substantially and, if so, whether it is likely to produce
procompetitive efficiencies that outweigh its anticompetitive
potential.
The policy statement gives the example of a five-hospital mar-
ket in which all of the hospitals agree to jointly purchase and
maintain a mobile lithotripter 11 that will be available one day
per week at each hospital. Although any combination of two of
the hospitals could afford to purchase the equipment and re-
cover their costs within the equipment's useful life, patient vol-
10. Commissioner Owen raised this point in her statement dissenting against the
issuance of the policy statements. See Owen Statement, supra note 8.
11. A lithotripter is an instrument that crushes calculi in the bladder.
[Vol. 3
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ume from all five hospitals is required to maximize the efficient
use of the machine. The agreement does not provide for joint
marketing of lithotripsy services and each hospital establishes its
own price for the service. This joint venture does not fall within
the antitrust safety zone because smaller groups of hospitals
could afford to purchase and operate lithotripters and recover
their costs. In these circumstances where the joint venture falls
outside the safety zone, the agencies would apply the rule of
reason analysis and would not challenge the venture because it
is limited to the purchase of the equipment and would not elimi-
nate competition among the hospitals in the provision of lithot-
ripsy services. The joint venture participants would not agree on
the prices at which each would market the lithotripsy services
provided by the jointly-owned equipment.
3. Physicians' provision of information to purchasers
An antitrust safety zone is established to allow physicians col-
lectively to provide to purchasers of health care services under-
lying medical data (for example, outcome data or suggested
practice parameters) that may improve purchasers' resolution of
issues related to the mode, quality or efficiency of treatment.
The collective provision of fee information is expressly excluded
from the safety zone, as are implied or threatened boycotts.
4. Exchange of price and cost information by hospitals
Hospitals are now permitted to exchange certain price and
cost information within the following antitrust safety zone: Hos-
pitals may participate in written surveys of a) prices for hospital
services or b) wages, salaries, or benefits of hospital personnel if
the following conditions are satisfied:
" the survey is managed by a third party (for example, a
purchaser, government agency, health care consultant,
academic institution, or trade association);
" the information provided by survey participants is based
on data more than three months old; and
" there are at least five hospitals reporting data upon which
each disseminated statistic is based, no individual hospi-
tal's data represents more than twenty-five percent on a
weighted basis of that statistic, and any information dis-
seminated is sufficiently aggregated such that it would
not allow recipients to identify the prices charged or com-
pensation paid by any particular hospital.
5
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The statement warns that exchanges of future prices for hospi-
tal services or future compensation of employees are likely to be
considered anticompetitive. It also warns that if an exchange of
information among competing hospitals of price or cost infor-
mation results in an agreement among competitors as to the
prices for hospital services or the wages to be paid hospital em-
ployees, that agreement will be considered per se unlawful.
5. Joint purchasing arrangements
A joint purchasing arrangement among health care providers
(hereinafter participants) falls within an antitrust safety zone if:
1) the amount of the total purchases accounts for less than
thirty-five percent of all sales of that product or service in the
relevant market; and 2) the total cost to the participants of the
products and services jointly purchased amounts to less than
twenty percent of each participant's total revenues from all
products or services sold by that participant.
To the extent that a joint purchasing arrangement does not
fall within the safety zone, the policy statement identifies several
safeguards that can minimize antitrust risks. For example, a
joint purchasing arrangement that does not require members to
purchase all of their requirements for a product or service
through the arrangement is less likely to raise concerns than one
that does. Similarly, the antitrust risk is lessened when joint
purchasing arrangements use an employee or agent independent
of its members to negotiate purchases and where communica-
tions between the joint purchasing organization and each of its
members are kept confidential.
6. Physician network joint ventures
An antitrust safety zone is established for physician network
joint ventures (for example, independent practice associations
(IPAs) or preferred provider organizations (PPOs)) that 1) are
comprised of twenty percent or less of the physicians in each
physician specialty who have active hospital staff privileges and
who practice in the relevant geographic market and 2) in which
the participating physicians share substantial financial risk. The
statement gives two examples of situations in which substantial
financial risk is shared by members of a physician network joint
venture:
* an agreement that services will be provided to a health
insurance plan at a capitated (per subscriber) rate; or
[Vol. 3
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* financial incentives for the joint venture's members to
achieve cost-containment goals, for example, withholding
a substantial amount (e.g., twenty percent) of the mem-
bers' compensation, with that amount distributed to the
members only if the cost-containment goals are met.
The statement notes that the antitrust safety zone applies to
both exclusive and nonexclusive IPAs and PPOs. 12 The factors
most likely to affect the federal agencies' assessment of the for-
mation of a physician network joint venture outside the safety
zone are the ability of payers to contract with physicians individ-
ually, the availability of a sufficient number of nonparticipating
physicians for another network to be formed, and the percep-
tion by payers that the network will be procompetitive.
The threshold of twenty percent of the physicians in the mar-
ket for the safety zone is quite conservative, particularly for
nonexclusive arrangements. Thus, the safety zone merely con-
firms that such a limited percentage of providers is an easy case,
without giving much additional certainty to physicians interested
in forming a network.
7. Expedited issuance of business review letters and advisory
opinions
For many years, the Justice Department and FTC have had a
procedure for handling requests for guidance. The Justice De-
partment issues business review letters and the FTC issues advi-
sory opinions describing their enforcement intentions in
connection with proposed conduct or transactions. 3 In practice,
however, there was often a delay of many months between a
request and a response.
The policy statements now commit the agencies to responding
to requests for business reviews or advisory opinions from the
health care community no later than 90 days after all necessary
information is received regarding any matter addressed in the
12. For an explanation of the difference between exclusive and nonexclusive IPAs
and PPOs, see U.S. HealthCare, Inc. v. HealthSource, Inc., 1992-1 Trade Cas. (CCH)
69,697 (D.N.H. Jan. 30, 1992), aff'd, 986 F.2d 589 (1st Cir. 1993).
13. The Department of Justice business review procedure is set forth at 28 C.F.R.
§ 50.6 (1993), while the Federal Trade Commission's procedure for seeking advisory
opinions is set forth at 16 C.F.R. §§ 1.1-1.4 (1994).
The Justice Department business review letters and the FTC's advisory opinions are
summarized in BNA's Antitrust & Trade Regulation Reporter and are available in
their entirety from the respective agencies. In addition, the Justice Department's
business review letters are available in Westlaw.
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statements, except requests relating to hospital mergers outside
the antitrust safety zone. The agencies commit to providing a
response to business review or advisory opinion requests regard-
ing other nonmerger health care matters within 120 days after
all necessary information is received.
B. Applications of the Policy Statements
Although the policy statements were issued in September,
both the Department of Justice and the FTC already have ap-
plied them in responding to requests for guidance by health care
providers. In its first application of the policy statements, the
Department of Justice announced its intention to not challenge
a proposal by the National Cardiovascular Network (NCN) to
establish a national network of cardiologists, cardiovascular sur-
geons, and acute care hospitals because the network qualified
for the antitrust safety zone set forth in the policy statement re-
lating to physician network joint ventures.' 4 Subsequently, both
the Department of Justice and the FTC applied the traditional
rule of reason analysis in endorsing the formation of two man-
aged care organizations to contract with third-party payers
where neither network fell within any of the policy statements'
antitrust safety zones. The Department of Justice approved a
proposal by the California Chiropractic Association (CCA) to
form a statewide chiropractic managed care organization to con-
tract with third-party payers at a capitated rate;15 the FTC ap-
proved a similar proposal on behalf of radiologists by California
Managed Care Imaging Medical Group (CMI).
NCN proposed to create a PPO of cardiac care specialists in
forty-one metropolitan areas to provide cardiac care services to
payers' beneficiaries for an all-inclusive, global price that would
cover all hospitalization and physician expenses. In thirty-eight
of the forty-one cities, NCN did not plan to contract with com-
peting cardiologists, cardiovascular surgeons, or acute care hos-
pitals; in the other three cities, NCN would not contract with
more than twenty percent of the cardiologists or cardiovascular
surgeons with active admitting privileges at hospitals in the rele-
vant geographic market. Thus, the proposed network clearly fell
within the physician network joint venture safety zone.
14. The proposed transaction was described in a Department of Justice business
review letter dated September 28, 1993. 7 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 9[ 50,118.
15. See Letter from Anne K. Bingaman, Assistant Attorney General, to George
Miron, Esq., dated December 8, 1993, 1993 WL 517169 (D.O.J.).
[Vol. 3
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The Department of Justice emphasized that the PPO's con-
tracts with third-party payers and providers would be nonexclu-
sive; in other words both payers and providers would remain
free to contract with any other PPO, health maintenance organi-
zation, independent practice association, or alternative delivery
system. The Department also indicated that it would be con-
cerned if the formation or operation of the PPO could raise the
prices for physician services above competitive levels or prevent
the formation of other physician joint ventures that would com-
pete with the proposed PPO. However, the Department of Jus-
tice concluded that NCN's proposal was unlikely to facilitate or
result in such anticompetitive conduct.
In contrast, the CCA proposal did not fall within the antitrust
safety zone established in the physician network joint venture
policy statement. Consistent with the policy statement, how-
ever, the Department of Justice applied the traditional rule of
reason analysis to conclude that the joint venture was not likely
to be anticompetitive. This determination was premised upon
several factors, particularly that the proposed managed care or-
ganization would be a bona fide joint venture in which the par-
ticipating chiropractors would assume significant financial risk;
the venture would not include more than fifty percent of the
chiropractors in any local market; the network would be nonex-
clusive in nature; and there were a variety of competing alterna-
tives available to payers if the chiropractors attempted to
exercise market power.
In a November 17, 1993 staff advisory opinion by the FTC's
Bureau of Competition, the FTC approved the formation and
operation of CMI, a preferred provider organization that was
created to facilitate radiological service arrangements between
payers and providers on a statewide or regional basis.16 The or-
ganization would not preclude its members from forming or par-
ticipating in other physician networks or prevent payers from
dealing with radiologists individually rather than through CMI.
CMI would offer a uniform price for all providers covered under
a regional or statewide contract and develop a capitated fee
structure within two years. To reduce the potential antitrust risk
of being charged with a boycott by the excluded radiologists,
CMI asserted that it would exclude physicians only to increase
efficiencies and competitiveness. It projected a two percent
16. 66 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1646, at 15 (Jan. 13, 1994).
1994]
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market share. The FTC concluded that CMI was unlikely to at-
tain market power and that its exclusion of physicians would not
constitute an unlawful boycott.
C. Conclusion
By issuing the policy statements, the federal antitrust enforce-
ment agencies provided more detailed guidance concerning
their enforcement policies in the health care field than is avail-
able to any other industry. However, the policy statements
highlight the fact-intensive nature of antitrust analysis and the
need for individual examination of transactions and conduct in
specific markets. This was illustrated by the agencies' careful
scrutiny and discussion of the NCN, CCA, and CMI ventures.
Nevertheless, the policy statements provide basic frameworks
that providers can use to develop cooperative arrangements that
are less likely to be challenged by the enforcement agencies.
Also, the policy statements publicly affirm what knowledgeable
antitrust practitioners have known all along-that the federal
antitrust enforcement agencies will not invoke the antitrust laws
to impede the development of innovative, efficiency-enhancing
arrangements by health care providers.
II. THE ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES FREQUENTLY
DISCUSS MERGER ENFORCEMENT BUT RARELY
CHALLENGE ONE
The prospect of health care reform and complaints by hospi-
tals (and their trade associations) that the 1992 Horizontal
Merger Guidelines provide inadequate guidance have intensified
the debate over the need for special hospital-specific antitrust
exemptions from the general merger laws.17 In response, the
federal enforcement agencies cite historical enforcement statis-
tics as evidence that their enforcement activities have not inhib-
ited hospital consolidation. For example, the FTC and
Department of Justice counted at least 229 hospital mergers be-
tween 1987 and 1991, during which time they formally investi-
gated only 27 transactions and challenged only 5.18
17. See, e.g., Antitrust Issues in the Health Care Industry: Hearing before the Sub-
committee on Medicare and Long-Term Care of the Committee on Finance, 103d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1993); OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL, AMERICAN HOSPITAL
Ass'N, HOSPITAL COLLABORATION: THE NEED FOR AN APPROPRIATE ANTITRUST
POLICY (1992).
18. See Chief Robert E. Bloch, Professions and Intellectual Property Section, De-
[Vol. 3
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In most respects, merger enforcement in 1993 was no differ-
ent than in prior years-hospital consolidation continued un-
abated and virtually unchallenged. The few hospital merger
cases filed by the enforcement agencies in 1993 typically arose in
connection with multi-hospital transactions between two or
more national hospital systems that owned competing hospitals
in isolated locations where there was only one other competitor.
In one case, the FTC objected to a consummated transaction
but, instead of requiring divestiture, merely ordered the offend-
ing party to seek prior approval of future acquisitions, a slap on
the hand at best.
A. Government Challenges to Hospital Mergers in 1993
In Dominican Santa Cruz Hospital,1 9the FTC alleged that the
1990 acquisition of AMI-Community Hospital (AMI) by Catho-
lic Healthcare West (CHW) and its local affiliate, Dominican
Santa Cruz Hospital (Dominican), increased the market share of
Dominican and CHW in Santa Cruz County from sixty-two per-
cent to seventy-six percent. Prior to the acquisition, there was
only one other hospital in the county besides Dominican and
AMI. Nevertheless, the FTC did not require CHW and Domin-
ican to divest AMI. Pursuant to the FTC consent order settling
the matter, Dominican and CHW will have to obtain FTC ap-
proval before acquiring all or any significant part of an acute
care hospital in Santa Cruz County, California during the next
ten years.20 The consent order also prohibits Dominican and
CHW from selling any hospital in Santa Cruz County unless the
acquirer agrees to be bound by the FTC order.
In a case involving the merger of two multi-hospital systems,
Columbia Hospital Corporation (Columbia) and Galen Health
Care Corporation (Galen), the FTC required Columbia and Ga-
len to obtain FTC approval before acquiring another hospital in
Osceola County, Florida during the next ten years.2 ' This case
differed from Dominican Santa Cruz, however, in that the con-
partment of Justice, Antitrust Division, Antitrust in the Health Care Field: Cutting
Edge Issues, Update and Perspectives from the Antitrust Division, Remarks at the
Meeting of the National Health Lawyers Association (Feb. 19, 1993).
19. [1987-93 Transfer Binder] Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 23,345 (Mar. 10, 1993).
20. Id. at 23,022.
21. In re Columbia Hosp. Corp., 5 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 23,450 (Aug. 27,
1993). The consent order also requires Columbia and Galen to obtain FTC approval
before selling any hospital in Osceola County to an entity that already owns a hospital
there.
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sent order also required Columbia to divest Kissimmee Memo-
rial Hospital, in Osceola County, before proceeding with its
acquisition of Galen. Absent the divestiture, the merger of Co-
lumbia and Galen would have combined the owners of two com-
peting hospitals in Osceola County, both located in Kissimmee.
The FTC alleged that the Osceola market is highly concentrated
and entry by new firms is difficult because of state regulatory
requirements and the substantial lead time required to establish
new hospitals.
In a related case, at the FFC's request, a federal district court
enjoined Columbia from acquiring Medical Center Hospital in
Charlotte County, Florida, because Columbia already owned a
hospital in the county.22 According to the F-FC complaint, there
was only one hospital in Charlotte County other than Medical
Center Hospital and Fawcett Memorial Hospital, the hospital
owned by Columbia. As in the Columbia/Galen case, the FTC
alleged that in addition to market concentration, state regula-
tion and the long lead time needed to open a hospital created
barriers to entry by new competitors. The preliminary injunc-
tion entered by the district court enjoined the acquisition until
the conclusion of administrative proceedings.23
Two recent announcements by the Department of Justice and
the FTC demonstrate why hospitals have complained about the
predictability of the federal agencies' merger enforcement pol-
icy. On January 24, 1994, the Department of Justice raised no
objection to the merger of Catholic Medical Center and Elliot
Hospital in Manchester, New Hampshire. 24 The Department of
Justice concluded that the six remaining hospitals serving the
same area as the merging hospitals provided adequate alterna-
tives to payers. 25 The agency also credited the strong commu-
nity support for the merger and the planned reduction of excess
22. FTC v. Columbia Hosp. Corp., 1993-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 70,209 (M.D. Fla.
May 5, 1993).
23. Columbia and the FTC settled this case on February 8, 1994, in an agreement
in which Columbia agreed not to acquire Medical Center and to seek FTC approval
before attempting to acquire or transfer any part of any general acute care hospital in
the Charlotte County, Florida area for the next ten years. Interestingly, Columbia
will also have to give the FTC prior notice before "consummating a joint venture with
any other acute-care hospital in the area to establish any new hospital or hospital-
based service or facility (unless Columbia's contribution to the venture is less than $1
million)." 5 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 23,548, at 23,223 (Feb. 8, 1994).
24. 66 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1699, at 136-37 (Feb. 3, 1994).
25. The relevant geographic market evaluated in this merger included not only the
town of Manchester, but also Concord, Nashua, Derry, and Exeter.
[Vol. 3
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capacity, which is expected to lower costs by $150 million over
10 years. In contrast, one week later, the FTC voted to chal-
lenge the merger of St. Mary-Corwin Regional Medical Center
and Parkview Episcopal Medical Center in Pueblo. Like the
Manchester, New Hampshire merger, the Pueblo merger in-
volved the consolidation of the only two hospitals in a small
town of approximately 100,000 inhabitants. Although the hospi-
tals expected the merger to generate substantial cost savings, the
FFC nevertheless decided to challenge the transaction.
The paucity of complaints filed by the federal antitrust agen-
cies in 1993 indicates that the agencies have not stepped up en-
forcement simply because the number of hospital mergers has
increased. Rather, the government continues to engage in selec-
tive enforcement, challenging only those mergers (or parts of
larger transactions) where the anticompetitive effects appear to
outweigh the provable potential procompetitive benefits.
B. Private Challenges to Hospital Acquisitions
In Askew v. DCH Regional Health Care Authority,26 the Elev-
enth Circuit held that an Alabama health care authority's 27 ac-
quisition of a privately owned hospital was immunized from the
antitrust laws under the state action doctrine.28 The court held
that an Alabama health care authority such as DCH constituted
a political subdivision of the state. It then found that the Ala-
bama Health Care Authorities Act of 1982 clearly expressed the
State's policy to displace competition in the field of health care
and that the Act specifically granted Alabama health care au-
thorities the powers to acquire, own, and operate health care
facilities.29 As a result, DCH's acquisition of the privately-
26. 995 F.2d 1033 (11th Cir. 1993).
27. Under Alabama law, health care authorities may own, operate, and manage
health care facilities. ALA. CODE §§ 22-21-310 to 22-21-359 (1990).
28. 995 F.2d 1033. In Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943), the Supreme Court
created the "state action" doctrine when it held that the Sherman Act does not apply
to the anticompetitive conduct of states acting as sovereigns. In California Retail
Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 105-06 (1980), the
Supreme Court held that private parties seeking antitrust immunity under the Parker
doctrine must satisfy the following two-prong test: 1) there must be a "clearly articu-
lated and affirmatively expressed" state policy authorizing the challenged conduct;
and 2) there must be active state supervision of the private parties as part of the
regulatory scheme. In Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34, 46-47 (1985),
the Supreme Court applied the state action doctrine to municipalities, but held that
the state did not have to actively supervise the conduct of municipalities as long as the
municipality could prove that it was acting pursuant to state policy.
29. 995 F.2d at 1039-40.
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owned hospital was immune from the application of the anti-
trust laws.30
III. EXCLUDED PHYSICIANS CONTINUE TO TRY, AND
GENERALLY FAIL, IN THEIR USE OF THE ANTITRUST
LAWS TO OBTAIN OR KEEP STAFF
PRIVILEGES
In 1986, Congress passed the Health Care Quality Improve-
ment Act (HCQIA)31 to curb claims by physicians that the peer
review process, which had resulted in the suspension of physi-
cians' hospital privileges, was anticompetitive and violated fed-
eral antitrust laws. In the few reported 1993 decisions
interpreting HCQIA, courts began to grant immunity to hospi-
tals and their staffs. However, courts construed HCQIA's lan-
guage narrowly and demanded strict compliance with its notice
and hearing requirements. In staff privileges cases that did not
involve HCQIA, the courts remained unsympathetic to plain-
tiffs seeking to invoke the antitrust laws to regain their sus-
pended privileges.
A. The Use of HCQIA to Immunize Peer Review Participants
With regard to a peer review that meets specific standards,
HCQIA grants immunity from damages to the peer review body
and its members, staff, and contractors, and "any person who
participates with or assists the body" for peer review action.32
The specific standards are set forth in § 11112(a), which states:
For the purposes set forth in § 11111(a) of this title, a profes-
sional review action must be taken-
(1) in the reasonable belief that the action was in the further-
ance of quality health care,
(2) after a reasonable effort to obtain the facts of the
matter,
(3) after adequate notice and hearing procedures are afforded
to the physician involved or after such other procedures as are
fair to the physician under the circumstances, and
(4) in the reasonable belief that the action was warranted by
the facts known after such reasonable effort to obtain facts
and after meeting the requirements of Paragraph (3).
A professional review action shall be presumed to have met
30. Id. at 1040-41.
31. 42 U.S.C. §§ 11101-11152 (West Supp. 1994).
32. 42 U.S.C. § 11111(a)(1) (1991).
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the preceding standards necessary for the protection set out in
section 11111(a) of this title unless the presumption is rebutted
by a preponderance of the evidence.
To benefit from the statutory grant of immunity, defendants
must 1) be persons covered under § 11111(a), and 2) have par-
ticipated in a professional review action meeting the standards
of § 11112(a).
In Farr v. Healtheast, Inc.,3 a district court applied HCQIA to
dismiss an obstetrician/gynecologist's claim that a hospital re-
voked his staff privileges in violation of federal antitrust laws.
The defendants included the hospital, its parent corporation, its
board of directors, and other hospital-related entities involved
in the peer review process, as well as various hospital staff mem-
bers. They denied liability stating that the plaintiff physician
continued to perform ovarian biopsies to diagnose Stein-
Leventhal syndrome even though he was repeatedly warned
that an ovarian biopsy was not an acceptable procedure for di-
agnosing the syndrome and that if he continued to perform
them disciplinary action would result. The hospital peer review
committee's suspension of the physician was approved by the
hospital's board of directors. An appeals committee reviewed
the peer review proceedings and found the suspension to be
justified.
The district court concluded that all of the defendants satis-
fied the requirements of HCQIA §§ 11111(a) and 11112(a).
Particularly, the court found that the plaintiff was afforded no-
tice and was requested to support his position at each step in the
review process. The court further found that the plaintiff re-
fused to follow the hospital's guidelines and continued to per-
form surgical procedures reasonably believed to present a real
danger to patients.34
In contrast, in Islami v. Covenant Medical Center, Inc.,3 the
court stated the general principle that a hospital that suspended
a surgeon's staff privileges would not be immune from antitrust
liability under HCQIA if that hospital did not comply with the
notice and hearing provisions of the hospital's bylaws or
HCQIA. The plaintiff, a board-certified cardiovascular and tho-
racic surgeon, maintained staff privileges at the defendant hospi-
tal from 1984 until his suspension on May 14, 1990. In 1988, he
33. 1993-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 70,294 (E.D. Pa. June 10, 1993).
34. Id. at 70,520.
35. 822 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Iowa 1992).
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set up a vascular testing laboratory in his office, which competed
with the hospital's radiology laboratory. On or about May 16 or
17, 1990, plaintiff was notified of his suspension, which was up-
held in August, 1990.
Plaintiff alleged that his suspension by the defendants vio-
lated the antitrust laws. The court denied defendants' motion
for summary judgment, which was founded on its claim of im-
munity, because the hospital did not follow its own bylaws,
which closely tracked HCQIA's adequate notice and hearing
provisions. The court also ruled that there was a genuine issue
of material fact as to whether the procedures that the hospital
followed in suspending the surgeon were fair given the entire
factual circumstances of the case. The court emphasized that
the hospital's board of directors had specific notice of the defi-
ciencies in the peer review process but chose to affirm the deci-
sion to suspend the physician's privileges.36
The court also concluded that the hospital and its physicians
were legally capable of conspiring in violation of the antitrust
laws because the physicians and the hospital could have person-
ally benefited from the plaintiff's suspension. The physicians on
the peer review committee competed with the surgeon in the
area of thoracic surgery and, by suspending the plaintiff, the
hospital achieved a monopoly on diagnostic testing in the rele-
vant market.37
In a decision with potentially significant ramifications for the
viability of HCQIA as a defense in peer review cases, the Sixth
Circuit in Manion v. Evans38 held that peer review participants
cannot immediately appeal a district court order denying them
summary judgment under HCQIA.39 As a general rule, denial
of summary judgment is not an appealable final order. How-
ever, the collateral order exception of 28 U.S.C. § 1291 permits
immediate appeal from orders that would conclusively deter-
mine the disputed question, resolve an important issue separate
from the merits of the action, and be effectively unreviewable
on appeal from a final judgment. Thus, courts have held that
immunity from suit or the right not to stand trial is immediately
reviewable. In Manion, however, the Sixth Circuit found that
HCQIA's legislative history indicates that its immunity extends
36. Id. at 1377-79.
37. Id. at 1383.
38. 986 F.2d 1036 (6th Cir. 1993).
39. Id. at 1042.
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only to liability for damages, not total immunity from suit.
Thus, a trial court's finding that a hospital and its staff are not
entitled to immunity under HCQIA is not immediately appeala-
ble.40 This decision, like Decker v IHC Hospital last year, effec-
tively undermines one of the primary anticipated benefits of
HCQIA-the ability of peer review participants to promptly
and relatively inexpensively obtain dismissal of antitrust claims
arising out of peer review actions taken in compliance with
HCQIA.
B. The Defense of Staff Privileges Cases on the Merits
Even when HCQIA was not invoked as a defense, courts have
found alternate grounds to summarily dismiss complaints
against hospitals and their staff arising out of peer review pro-
ceedings. In this respect, hospitals continued their long run of
successfully defeating antitrust claims made by physicians whose
privileges were revoked or denied in the first place.
In Balaklaw v. Lovell,41 the Second Circuit held that the plain-
tiff lacked standing to assert his antitrust claims because his al-
leged injuries were personal in nature, not the type that the
antitrust laws were intended to prevent. The plaintiff, the for-
mer chief of the anesthesiology department at defendant Cort-
land Memorial Hospital (CMH) in New York, lost his privileges
when CMH awarded an exclusive contract to a competing anes-
thesiology group that submitted a lower bid. The plaintiff al-
leged that CMH and others engaged in a group boycott and
unreasonably restrained trade by preventing him from practic-
ing anesthesiology at CMH.
In affirming the district court's grant of summary judgment in
favor of CMH, the Second Circuit concluded that competition
was not foreclosed in either of the two relevant markets. In the
market for consumers of anesthesiology services, the only
change was the identity of the group providing the exclusive
services. In the market for providers of anesthesiology services,
the geographic scope of the market could be multi-state or even
40. Id. at 1041-42. See also Decker v. IHC Hosp., Inc., 982 F.2d 433 (10th Cir.
1992) (denial of immunity to professional peer review body under HCQIA was not
immediately appealable because HCQIA immunizes peer review participants from
damages liability only, not liability from suit).
41. 1994-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 70,497 (2d Cir. Jan. 26, 1994).
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nationwide as evidenced by the hospital's solicitation of propos-
als from anesthesiology groups in seven states.42
In Flegel v. Christian Hospital Northeast-Northwest,43 the
Eighth Circuit affirmed a grant of summary judgment in favor of
the defendants based upon the plaintiffs' failure to present suffi-
cient evidence of anticompetitive effects. Plaintiffs, two osteo-
pathic doctors who were denied privileges at Christian Hospital
Northeast-Northwest (Christian), had applied to be the first os-
teopathic urologists on Christian's staff. They relied on the affi-
davits of osteopathic doctors in general practice at Christian
who asserted that their patients would receive better care if
treated by the plaintiffs than by medical doctor urologists.
However, the court found no evidence that the allegedly lower
quality of care had caused the affiants to move a patient out of
Christian for treatment by the plaintiffs. 44 The court also held
that the plaintiffs failed to prove that the relevant market was
limited to urologists' services at Christian rather than in the St.
Louis metropolitan area.45
In Willman v. Heartland Hospital East,46 the court granted
summary judgment in favor of a hospital and the physicians who
participated in the peer review process at issue. The plaintiff
alleged that his competitors participated in the peer review pro-
cess as a "sham" to cover up their intent to drive him from the
market. The court rejected plaintiff's claim that the defendants
committed a per se violation of the Sherman Act. Citing Flegel,
the court stated that the exclusion from staff privileges fell
within the category of "industry self-regulation," which was not
appropriate for per se analysis.4 7 The court also rejected plain-
tiff's claim under the rule of reason analysis. The court ruled
that the insignificant competitive advantage to be gained by the
42. Id. at 71,699.
43. 4 F.3d 682 (8th Cir. 1993).
44. Id. at 689.
45. Id. at 690-91. The Eighth Circuit also rejected the plaintiffs' argument that
the defendants' actions that led the hospital to deny them privileges amounted to a
group boycott subject to per se analysis under the Sherman Act. The court stated that
the practice of excluding nonphysicians in favor of physicians was not one that would
always have an anticompetitive effect; therefore, it was appropriate to apply the rule
of reason analysis. The court also stated that the exclusion from staff privileges con-
stitutes "industry self-regulation," which is not appropriate for per se analysis. Id. at
687.
46. 836 F. Supp. 1522 (W.D. Mo. 1993).
47. Id. at 1527.
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forty-three physicians alleged to be competitors rendered the
plaintiff's conspiracy claim implausible.48
Other courts have invoked the state action doctrine to insu-
late hospitals and their staffs from potential antitrust liability.
In Bolt v. Halifax Hospital Medical Center,49 the Eleventh Cir-
cuit held that Halifax Hospital Medical Center was entitled to
summary judgment on plaintiff's claim that it conspired with its
peer review committee in violation of the antitrust laws. The
Eleventh Circuit previously had held in the same case that the
hospital should be treated as a municipality subject to the state
action doctrine, but denied the hospital immunity because plain-
tiff had alleged that the hospital conspired with its peer review
board to deny him staff privileges.50 After the United States
Supreme Court held that there was no conspiracy exception to
the state action immunity doctrine in City of Columbia v. Omni
Outdoor Advertising, Inc., 1 the Bolt court granted the hospital
summary judgment.
In Scara v. Bradley Memorial Hospital,52 two licensed anes-
thesiologists alleged that the exclusive contract of Bradley Me-
morial Hospital, a public hospital, with Cleveland
Anesthesiologists was an unlawful tying arrangement and estab-
lished a monopoly in favor of Cleveland Anesthesiologists. The
court held that the defendants were subject to the state action
immunity doctrine because Tennessee law vested the hospital
with the authority to enter into contracts for the employment of
all personnel and the hospital actively supervised Cleveland An-
esthesiologists' performance under the contract. 3
Other courts ruled in favor of hospitals and their staffs on the
grounds that a hospital is legally incapable of conspiring with its
medical staff in violation of the antitrust laws during the peer
review process. In Pudlo v. Adamski, the Seventh Circuit dis-
missed a physician's complaint alleging that a hospital violated
the antitrust laws when it terminated his staff privileges.54 The
court held that a hospital is legally incapable of conspiring with
its medical staff during the peer review process where the medi-
cal staff has been delegated the authority to recommend action
48. Id. at 1531.
49. 980 F.2d 1381 (11th Cir. 1993).
50. Bolt v. Halifax Hosp. Medical Ctr., 891 F.2d 810 (11th Cir. 1990).
51. 499 U.S. 365 (1991).
52. 1993-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 70,353 (E.D. Tenn. Apr. 4, 1993).
53. Id. at 70,843.
54. 65 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1628, at 265-66 (Aug. 19, 1993).
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to the hospital's board. In reaching its decision, the Seventh
Circuit followed similar decisions in the Third and Fourth Cir-
cuits and rejected the contrary reasoning of the Ninth and Elev-
enth Circuits.
Plaintiffs were not shut out entirely in 1993. In a decision
driven by the case's unsavory facts, the Eleventh Circuit (which
previously held that a hospital can conspire with its staff) rein-
stated a verdict of $450,000 against a hospital in a staff privileges
case in Boczar v. Manatee Hospitals & Health Systems. 6 The
court reversed a judgment notwithstanding the verdict in favor
of the defendant Manatee Memorial Hospital (Manatee), which
had terminated the plaintiff's staff privileges. The district court
had granted Manatee's motion for judgment notwithstanding
the verdict after the individual defendants on the peer review
committee were dismissed, holding that the verdict against the
hospital for conspiring in violation of the antitrust laws was in-
consistent with the dismissal of the individual defendants. The
appellate court reversed, holding that the hospital could have
conspired with members of the hospital staff other than the indi-
vidual defendants or even with the named defendants, who
could have been found not liable by the jury because they were
either not the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries or were
immune from liability.57
The court found sufficient evidence that Manatee conspired
with others to restrain the plaintiff's practice of medicine. First,
the court held that the hospital had an economic incentive to
terminate the plaintiff. When the plaintiff first joined the medi-
cal staff, several competing members of the obstetrics/gynecol-
ogy staff defected to a competing hospital. Manatee feared
further defections because the plaintiff's prices were signifi-
cantly lower than those of competing physicians at Manatee.
Also, the plaintiff had reported numerous errors made by the
hospital's staff.5 8 Second, Manatee's alleged reason for sus-
pending the plaintiff proved to be false. Although the hospital
alleged that the plaintiff had abandoned a patient, the patient
55. Compare Oksanen v. Page Memorial Hosp., 945 F.2d 696 (4th Cir. 1991) and
Nanavati v. Burdette Tomlin Memorial Hosp., 857 F.2d 96 (3d Cir. 1988) with Oltz v.
St. Peter's Community Hosp., 861 F.2d 1440 (9th Cir. 1988) and Bolt v. Halifax Hosp.
Ctr.
56. 993 F.2d 1514 (11th Cir. 1993).
57. Id. at 1516-17 & n.5.
58. Id. at 1517-18.
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testified at trial that she was not the plaintiff's patient and that
the hospital had tricked her into signing a misleading affidavit. 59
Because of its unique facts, Manatee should not be of great
concern to hospitals or participants in the peer review process.
It does show, however, that once a hospital grants a physician
staff privileges, it must act prudently in revoking them.
IV. THE AGENCIES ENCOURAGE THE FORMATION OF
PHYSICIAN NETWORKS BUT DISCOURAGE THEM
FROM OPERATING ANTICOMPETITIVELY
The federal antitrust enforcement agencies have actively en-
couraged physician networks and joint ventures formed to nego-
tiate risk-sharing contracts with managed care payers.
However, when these networks act anticompetitively, the agen-
cies have not hesitated to challenge their conduct. Thus, the
agencies have signaled that they will not challenge physician
networks that do not wield market power and operate nonexclu-
sively-that is, when the network members are free to negotiate
and contract with payers independently from the group. In con-
trast, if a provider organization is formed to engage in price fix-
ing without risk sharing or to prevent the development of
managed care by engaging in a concerted refusal to deal, the
agencies will intercede to protect competition.
In a January 7, 1993 business review letter, the Department of
Justice stated its intent not to challenge a proposal by Case
Western Reserve University School of Medicine and University
Hospitals of Cleveland to use a single agent to negotiate con-
tract terms and fees with third-party payers on behalf of
nineteen separate, noncompeting physician practice groups that
provide medical care at the hospitals.6° The agent was to advise
third-party payers that they could negotiate directly with any
practice group, and each practice group was free to accept or
reject an agent-negotiated contract. Moreover, all practice
group contracts would be independent from each other. The
Department of Justice concluded that the proposal was unlikely
to increase the availability of fee and cost information among
competing providers and thus unlikely to facilitate collusion.
The Department of Justice also noted that the arrangement
59. Id. at 1518-19.
60. 64 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1597, at 11-12 (Jan. 14, 1993) (the
full text of the business review letter is available in Westlaw, at 1993 WL 4171
(D.O.J.)).
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would expedite negotiations and facilitate the bargaining pro-
cess, thereby lowering the costs associated with contracting.
Similarly, in a November 8, 1993 business review letter, the
Department of Justice announced that it would not challenge a
proposal by St. Anthony Medical Center in Rockford, Illinois to
offer preferred provider contracts to employers and other third-
61 Anparty payers. St. Anthony proposed to enter into multiple,
nonexclusive subcontracts with physicians and/or another hospi-
tal, and then offer managed care contracts that would combine
St. Anthony and the subcontracting providers as joint preferred
providers. Its goal was to compete more vigorously for man-
aged care contracts. The subcontract between St. Anthony and
the other hospital would include overflow services (services that
St. Anthony would be unable to provide) as well as patient-
choice services (services that St. Anthony provides but that the
patient would prefer to receive from the other hospital). How-
ever, referrals for both overflow and patient-choice services
would be limited to an amount equal to twenty percent of St.
Anthony admissions. The Department of Justice concluded that
the nonexclusivity provision and the referral limitation would
protect against any anticompetitive behavior. Moreover, the
proposal would increase competition for managed care plans
and help drive down costs for consumers.
In contrast, when an independent practice association (IPA)
served as a vehicle for competing physicians to engage in a boy-
cott of a health maintenance organization (HMO), the Depart-
ment of Justice intervened to prohibit the unlawful,
anticompetitive conduct. In United States v. Greater Bridgeport
Individual Practice Association, Inc.,62 an IPA and its members,
who constituted about ninety percent of the physicians in the
Bridgeport, Connecticut area, were prohibited by a consent de-
cree from entering into any agreements whereby the members
would not contract individually with an HMO. The IPA was
also required to establish an antitrust compliance program. 63
61. 65 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1640, at 652 (Nov. 18, 1993) (the
full text of the business review letter is available in Westlaw, 1993 WL 482071
(D.O.J.)).
62. 1993-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 70,389 (D. Conn. Jan. 1, 1993).
63. The FTC took similar action against the McLean County Chiropractic Associ-
ation, a group representing thirteen competing chiropractors in the Bloomington/Nor-
mal, Illinois area, which had set and then periodically voted to raise the maximum
fees its members could charge patients and third-party payers for their services. In re
McLean County Chiropractic Ass'n, 5 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 23,524 (Jan. 5, 1994).
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In one of the first cases to emerge from the FTC's investiga-
tion of physician referrals to self-owned firms, two San Fran-
cisco Bay Area home medical equipment firms and their twenty-
eight investing physicians agreed to reduce the number of physi-
cian partners in each company to resolve FrC charges that the
firms violated antitrust laws in obtaining high market shares.64
According to the FTC complaint, the joint ventures permitted
groups of specialists to control the market for an ancillary ser-
vice by controlling patient access to that service. In each case,
the ancillary service was the provision of oxygen systems pre-
scribed for home use by patients with lung, heart, or other dis-
eases who cannot obtain sufficient oxygen through normal
breathing. In general, patients who require oxygen systems re-
ceive the services of pulmonologists or of hospital staff members
who are supervised by pulmonologists. As a result, pulmonolo-
gists can influence the choice of which oxygen systems supplier
will service their patients. According to the FTC complaints,
sixty percent of the pulmonologists in the areas served by the
two medical equipment firms became affiliated in one or the
other of the two firms. Furthermore, several of the pulmonolo-
gists partners were medical directors of the respiratory therapy
departments of hospitals in the firms' service areas. Under the
proposed consent agreements between the firms and the FTC,
the pulmonologists in each partnership would be required to re-
duce their collective ownership so that twenty-five percent or
less of the pulmonologists in the relevant geographic market are
affiliated with the partnership.
V. COURTS REFUSE TO INTERFERE WITH THE
PROCOMPETITIVE OPERATION OF MANAGED CARE
ORGANIZATIONS
There has been a paucity of private litigation involving the
operation of managed care organizations. In two important
cases in 1993, however, the courts upheld the conduct of health
maintenance organizations against challenges by excluded com-
The FTC prohibited the Association from entering into any agreement with any chi-
ropractor to 1) discuss or collectively determine fees, or 2) deal with payers on collec-
tively determined terms. For an explanation of maximum fee price fixing, see
Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332 (1982).
64. In re Home Oxygen & Medical Equip. Co., 5 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 23,490
(Nov. 2, 1993).
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peting physicians in one case and by a competing managed care
organization in the other.
In Capital Imaging Associates, P. C. v. Mohawk Valley Medical
Associates, Inc. ,65 the Second Circuit affirmed summary judg-
ment in favor of member physicians of an IPA model HMO
against allegations that it denied the plaintiff's application for
membership into the IPA in violation of the antitrust laws.
Plaintiff Capital Imaging Associates, P.C. (Capital) was a pri-
vate radiology group in Albany County, New York, offering di-
agnostic imaging services. Defendant Mohawk Valley Medical
Associates, Inc. (Mohawk) was an independent physician prac-
tice association providing medical care to enrollees in defendant
Mohawk Valley Physicians Health Plan (the Plan). The Plan
purchased medical services from Mohawk at a fixed capitated
rate per individual enrollee and did not permit price competi-
tion among the doctors. The court held that Capital failed to
prove any anticompetitive effects on the relevant market be-
cause the radiology service fees would remain the same irrespec-
tive of whether the plaintiff was admitted into Mohawk.66 The
court also held that Capital failed to establish the defendant's
market power-the Plan's 100,500 enrollees represented only
2.3 percent of the region's HMO subscribers and Mohawk's
membership included only 6.75 percent of the region's physi-
cians. The court noted that Mohawk's market share was even
lower, 1.15 percent, if the market was defined as including com-
petition from non-HMO sources. 67
In U.S. HealthCare, Inc. v. HealthSource, Inc.,68 plaintiff, one
of the largest providers of HMO services in the country, alleged
that the defendant HMO entered into an unlawful exclusive
dealing arrangement with its primary care physicians. Prior to
the filing of the complaint, defendant Healthsource was the only
nonstaff model HMO in New Hampshire. In the Fall of 1989,
Healthsource notified its panel of doctors that they would re-
ceive greater compensation if they agreed not to contract with
any other HMO. A doctor who accepted Healthsource's offer
remained free to serve non-HMO patients and could revert to
nonexclusive participation in Healthsource by giving adequate
notice.
65. 996 F.2d 537 (2d Cir. 1993).
66. Id. at 546.
67. Id. at 547.
68. 986 F.2d 589 (1st Cir. 1993).
[Vol. 3
24
Annals of Health Law, Vol. 3 [1994], Iss. 1, Art. 3
http://lawecommons.luc.edu/annals/vol3/iss1/3
Antitrust Enforcement
Plaintiff challenged the exclusivity clause as both a group boy-
cott and an attempt to monopolize. On the boycott claim, the
court held that an exclusivity clause that was terminable on
thirty days' notice posed only a de minimis constraint and, de-
spite the fact that Healthsource had exclusive contracts with
twenty-five percent of the primary care physicians in the rele-
vant market, competing HMOs were not precluded from enter-
ing the market and contracting with the remaining doctors.69
On the monopolization claim, the court found that plaintiff
failed to properly define the relevant product and geographic
markets. The court stated that there was an issue whether the
product market consisted only of HMOs or constituted the
broader market of health care financing, which would include
indemnity insurers, staff model HMOs, and preferred provider
organizations. The court stated that the geographic market
could have been southern New Hampshire or the whole state.70
VI. TRADE ASSOCIATION ACTIVITIES CONTINUE TO
RECEIVE CLOSE SCRUTINY BY THE FEDERAL
ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES
Trade associations can be procompetitive or, in some cases,
they can serve as a vehicle for their members to engage in an-
ticompetitive behavior. As the antitrust enforcement policy
statements indicate, the exchange of competitively sensitive
price and cost data by trade associations can create antitrust
concerns.
For example, in an October 1, 1993 business review letter, the
Department of Justice stated it would challenge a proposal sub-
mitted on behalf of the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Associa-
tion (PMA) to implement a program whereby its member
companies would commit to limit their price increases on their
entire line of prescription drug products in any calendar year to
an amount not to exceed the increase in the Consumer Price
Index.71 According to the PMA, it developed the proposed pro-
gram in response to concerns about controlling health care
costs, including the cost of prescription drugs, pending imple-
mentation of comprehensive health care reform. Each PMA
member company would decide unilaterally whether to partici-
pate in the program and was free to withdraw at any time. The
69. Id. at 596-97.
70. Id. at 599.
71. Available in Westlaw, 1993 WL 403573 (D.O.J.).
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Department of Justice characterized the PMA proposal as an
arrangement among competitors that limits individual pricing
decisions-a per se Sherman Act Section 1 violation. The De-
partment of Justice emphasized that the antitrust laws do not
prohibit individual firms from adopting and announcing pricing
policies that are intended to contain or limit increases in the
prices of their products.72
In contrast, in an October 13, 1993 business review letter, the
Department of Justice announced that it would not challenge a
voluntary data exchange program by a health care trade associa-
tion for transporting products commonly sold in drugstores.7 3
The Health and Personal Care Distribution Conference
(HPCDC), a trade association comprised of seventy-five mem-
bers that distribute drugs, medicines, toilet preparations, and re-
lated articles to wholesale and retail customers, proposed to
survey its members periodically regarding their actual experi-
ence with general freight motor carriers. A third party would
compile the information and publish the results. The published
report would not identify any of the survey results with any par-
ticular member of HPCDC participating in the survey. The De-
partment of Justice stated that the proposed information
exchange could be potentially anticompetitive if it resulted in
the exercise of monopsony power over transportation rates, but
that HPCDC could not negotiate transportation rates collec-
tively on behalf of any of its members. The Department of Jus-
tice also concluded that the information exchange would not
facilitate price collusion or otherwise reduce competition for the
purchase or sale of the members' products; the members' prod-
ucts have relatively high selling prices, with the transportation
cost representing less than two percent of the total price. Since
the transportation cost component of the selling price was so
low, HPCDC's members would be unable to use the informa-
tion exchange as a vehicle by which to collude on the prices of
their products.
72. The Sherman Act proscribes concerted action to unreasonably restrain trade.
It does not reach conduct that is "wholly unilateral." Copperweld Corp. v. Indepen-
dence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 768 (1984).
73. 65 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1635, at 491 (Oct. 14, 1993) (the
full text of the business review letter is available in Westlaw, 1993 WL 421017
(D.O.J.)).
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CONCLUSION
The fundamental purpose of the antitrust laws is to promote
competition, not to protect any individual competitor or select
group of individuals. During 1993, the enforcement agencies
construed and the courts applied the antitrust laws to the health
care field with that objective firmly in mind by encouraging co-
operation among providers to reduce costs or increase efficiency
and challenging those arrangements formed or operated for an-
ticompetitive purposes.
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